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Abstract
Scottish political culture adhered to a form of universalism from the Enlightenment until quite recently. In that sense, it denied its own distinctiveness, asserting as part of the very definition of the nation that national distinctiveness ought to be subsumed into liberal principles that are applicable everywhere and at all times. These universalistic ideas changed as society changed, and became more truly universal with the advent of universal democracy and the end of Empire. They are one reason why Scotland remained attached to the British union, and indeed Britain itself came to embody the concept of universalism from the middle of the eighteenth century until well after the middle of the twentieth. Recent Scottish political assertion has, however, moved away from this self-confident universalism. The article discusses the implications for the current debate about Scottish independence of both the longer history and the recent change.
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1. Introduction
Scottish political culture is founded on a paradox. On the one hand, it has been seen, and has seen itself, as intellectual, educated, utopian in its aim to build a society based on the rational ordering of human affairs. On the other hand, in proclaiming these values to be universal, Scotland has denied its own distinctive existence. Because these values are asserted to apply to everyone, everywhere, at any time, they are not specifically Scottish. The paradox has problematic implications for the decision about its constitutional future which the country now faces. Scotland until very recently has not asserted itself on the basis of a particular culture that marks it off from everywhere else, except insofar as it marks it off from places that do not assert universal values. Scotland has not asserted itself in the usual way of small nations seeking autonomy in the past century and a half: its assertion has not been about distinctive languages or religions or ethnicity. Scottish political culture has asserted values that are not specific to anywhere, and certainly not to Scotland. In doing so, Scotland in the past 200 years has helped to create a world in which the values to which it has held have become so general as to make Scotland not particularly different.
The purpose of this article is to expand on the claim so far as the history of the last couple of hundred years is concerned, drawing out the dilemma which it creates for the country today. Does that kind of Scottish assertion of universal values remain the dominant way in which the country sees its distinctive contribution to the world? If Scotland no longer believes its values to be universal, what does that tell us about the country and about its political future?
2. Scottish Universalism
But before we get to that, we need to ask why we should take an historical approach to the present debate about Scotland’s future. Surely, it might be argued, what matters is where Scotland is going to rather than where it is coming from. Is not in fact the bane of Scottish life its obsession with the past? We will consider the future towards the end, but the reason why history matters is that it shapes us, and we choose to let it shape us. It shapes, in particular, this debate we are now having in Scotland about the country’s future direction. In many respects, the argument is really about two versions of Scotland’s history, which we might reduce to a very simple question: was it a good or a bad thing that the country united with England three hundred years ago? Nationalists know the power of history, of the stories which a society tells about itself. But so also, of course, do unionists, who tell Scotland’s story as an achievement because of that union. In Scotland, with its political history, it matters also that socialists, too, tend to value the past rather more than they admit. Socialism finds some of its strongest sources of inspiration in the memory of past struggles and of victories gained – of the welfare state, or universal education, or, before that, of the emergence of universal democracy. Scottish culture is full of these evocative images in which national history and left-wing politics resonate with each other. For all these currents of thought – socialist, unionist, nationalist – the past is believed to show what we are capable of achieving, and thus is an inspiration to future action. My concern with the past then is to try to elucidate what is this history of ideas and of social practice that can be told in seemingly quite different ways by these often antagonistic camps.
We could start as far back as the Reformation in the sixteenth century, with its assertion of the principle that all people are equal before God, and – in Scotland – its practical effect in the system of universal parish schooling that was firmly in place by the time of the Union: these were schools where all children, girls as well as boys, poor as well as rich, learned to read and write so that they might interpret the bible for themselves. That was the beginning of a form of democratic citizenship that Scotland more or less pioneered, and that it then exported right across the world. Or we could start even further back, with the appeal of the nobles of Scotland to the Pope in the Declaration of Arbroath of 1320, asserting the limited nature of sovereignty, and asserting that the king would be tolerated only if he respected the rights of the people of the nation. This Declaration, so often invoked as a nationalist document (a declaration of independence), is at least as importantly an assertion that no man has the right to rule over anyone without consent. These were universal ideas of rights asserted in Scotland long before the concept was elaborated for the modern age.
But it is with that process of modern elaboration that we will in fact start, with that great debate about rights and values and human inter-dependency that came later to be called the Scottish Enlightenment. We start with that eighteenth-century point because that really founds Scotland’s conceptual contribution to the modern world. What mattered about the Enlightenment was its embedded popularity. The leading figures – David Hume, Adam Ferguson, Adam Smith – were, it is true, internationally known, and spent most of their time in the great universities that were also one of Scotland’s distinguished contributions to the life of the mind. But their audiences were in the local publishers, in the pamphlets and the debating societies and the beginnings of what became a national press (Sher, 1985). They were present also in the pulpit: Scotland was the only country in Europe where moderate ministers of religion were among the Enlightenment’s leaders. And the audiences were there because of the universal literacy that the schools of the Reformation had eventually brought about. So when Adam Smith was thinking about human sociability, or about how we might buy and sell from each other without fraud or exploitation, he was not an abstract academic theorist: he was thinking about conversations in places such as his Kirkcaldy, epitomising the Scotland of small trading burghs that gave him his model of a self-organising society. Thus the Scottish Enlightenment’s social theory was for everyone and had to apply to everyone: it was, in its very act of creation, universal.
What, then, did these Scots bequeath to the modern world by way of principles of social organisation? The first point was that there could be what Hume called a science of human nature: ‘as the science of man is the only solid foundation for the other sciences,’ he wrote, ‘so the only solid foundation we can give to this science itself must be laid on experience and observation’ (Hume, 1978 [1739]: xvi). The purpose then was to discover principles that would be true of all human beings, anywhere and at any time, principles that would operate as universally for human affairs as the discoveries that their fellow intellectuals, the natural scientists, were making about the natural world. Lord Kames, leading Scottish legal thinker of the age, summed it up: ‘reason is exercised in discovering causes and tracing effects through a long chain of dependencies’ (Berry, 1997: 55). As Christopher Berry has put it in his account of the Enlightenment’s social thought: ‘constancy or uniformity of human nature is the governing assumption’. (Berry, 1997: 68).
From that aspiration to have a science of human affairs we get all the modern social sciences, and also all the great modern systems of emancipatory thought – liberalism, socialism, communism, feminism, anti-racism: in short, we get the very idea that human beings are essentially the same and therefore not only can be understood in the same way regardless of where they are, but also have the same rights whoever they are. Thus, the most fundamental way in which Scottish Enlightenment culture was about universal values was its aspiration to find a universally applicable science of human beings. That foundation of all modern Scottish political culture places Scotland absolutely at the heart of humanity. Indeed (given the Scots’ tendency to messianic self-belief) it imagines Scotland as leading humanity to a more enlightenment state of affairs.
But there was more to this universalism than just the aspiration to have a general science of human beings. The universal principles were also found in the results of that science – the conclusions that these pioneering social scientists came to. One of these universal principles is the belief in the importance of mutual sympathy, what Adam Smith called ‘moral sentiments’. In his words:
to restrain our selfish, and to indulge our benevolent affections, constitutes the perfection of human nature; and can alone produce among mankind that harmony of sentiments and passions in which consists their whole grace and propriety.
(Smith, 1984 [1759]: I.i.5.5)
Although Smith is often thought of – not inaccurately – as an ardent believer in the importance of individualism, individualism was felt to be potentially destructive unless restrained. For Smith, unless a sense of mutual sympathy prevailed, the free market would be destructive because the unscrupulous would exploit the weak. No law would be powerful enough to enforce civilisation unless there was universal human respect. In one of his most famous passages he said:
man ought to regard himself, not as something separated and detached, but as a citizen of the world, a member of the vast commonwealth of nature. To the interest of this great community, he ought at all times to be willing that his own little interest should be sacrificed. Whatever concerns himself, ought to affect him no more than whatever concerns any other equally important part of this immense system. We should view ourselves, not in the light in which our own selfish passions are apt to place us, but in the light in which any other citizen of the world would view us. What befalls ourselves we should regard as what befalls our neighbour, or, what comes to the same thing, as our neighbour regards what befalls us.
(Smith, 1984 [1759]: III.3.11)
Here then is the close interconnection between principles of social respect and universalism of values: it is because every human being is worthy of equal respect that the principles of morality, according to this belief, apply equally to everyone.
A second universal principle asserted as part of the Scottish Enlightenment science of human affairs was that of what we would now call social capital, which was the practical principle of social organisation that corresponded to these general ideas. It can be summed up nicely by a sort of parable from Hume, about the mutual dependence of a farming community: ‘your corn is ripe today; mine is tomorrow. ’Tis profitable for us both, that I should labour with you today, and that you should aid me tomorrow’ (Hume, 1978 [1739]: III, ii, 5). Hume thus found social capital growing in bonds of obligation that counter the belief of the English political philosopher Thomas Hobbes that society was perpetually at war with itself, a view against which many of the Scottish Enlightenment philosophers strenuously argued. Society would fall apart, according to Smith, if there was not a common sense of justice, and there was a role for government in upholding that (Smith 1984 [1759]: II, ii, 3, 6-9). Hume believed this role for government to be the very origin of ‘civil government and allegiance’ (Hume 1978 [1739]: III, ii, 7).
It was also believed that public spirit could be actively created. Both Smith and Hume argued that a sense of justice required educating. So education was also at the heart of the ideas of the Enlightenment, which is the third universal principle that they asserted. Smith believed that education was too important to be left to the market or to voluntary action. Elementary education ought to be publicly provided, and to be compulsory, and became all the more important the more that a government depended on the goodwill of the people. In a passage that seems to anticipate by a century and a half the importance of universal education for democracy, Smith wrote in The Wealth of Nations in 1776:
in free countries, where the safety of government depends very much upon the favourable judgement which the people may form of its conduct, it must surely be of the highest importance that they should not be disposed to judge rashly or capriciously concerning it.
These virtues would be brought about by public education (Smith, 1981 [1776]: V.i.f).
All these comments on social stability point also to the importance which the Enlightenment thinkers attached to the Union, not out of any sense of mystical or sentimental Britishness, but from the simple political principle that the new state had brought about peace and prosperity. They believed that the Union fostered economic development, encouraged civilised respect, and offered an opportunity for these new ideas to emerge onto the world stage.
So by the end of the eighteenth century, Scottish political culture was firmly set on a path that was in aspiration universal. Values were developed that were embraced not because they were traditional, not because they were Scottish, but because they were for everyone. That then is the appearance of the paradox that haunts Scottish politics to the present day. The core Scottish values deny the very specificity of the culture from which they come, because these values insist that cultural specificity is less important than what human beings have in common. Custom, Smith said, should always be subordinate to universal principle: ‘custom should never pervert our sentiments with regard to the general style and character of conduct and behaviour’ (Smith 1984 [1759]: V.2.16).
As is too well-known to need repeating in detail here, Adam Smith became the guiding intellectual force behind nineteenth-century liberalism, so persuasive were his arguments that the free interaction of autonomous individuals was the best way to guarantee prosperity, social stability and peace (Chitnis, 1986; Robertson, 1990). That respect accorded to Smith was itself a mark of the sheer scope of Scottish ideas: the market, the world learnt from Scottish thinkers, could contribute to solving any social problem, anywhere. And in obvious ways, that long-term influence of Scottish ideas is even more evident now, following the collapse of the main alternative way of governing society – the communist totalitarian regimes, and before them the fascist totalitarian regimes. Democracy and the market, in some form, are now inseparable.
But matters are not so simple, because faith in the invisible hand of the market was only part of what eighteenth-century Scottish culture bequeathed to us. Equally important has indeed been Smith’s concept of mutual human sympathy – the moral sense of obligation that restrains the market from excess. So the next phase of the story of Scottish universalism is not only its role in enabling markets to spread across the globe, but also the accompanying critique of the worst that markets can do. In short, the critique of nineteenth-century and twentieth-century capitalism also has deep Scottish routes.
Here again the central feature of Scottish political culture is its universality. Other small European nations in the nineteenth century were finding their distinctive identities often from underneath the oppressive rule of the various empires that governed most of Europe. Scotland did not need to do this. It was already secure in its identity because that identity had not in any significant way been impeded at that time by Union with England: indeed most Scots believed that Scottish identity in the form that most Scots then valued had flourished because of the Union, and they believed that the Union had enabled Scottish values to have far greater influence than they would otherwise have had. So Scottish cultural distinctiveness in the nineteenth century was not, as in other small nations, asserted against the outside world. It was asserted as part of that world. Indeed in aspiration it was asserted to lead the wider world.
The most influential Scottish critique of nineteenth-century capitalism was by Thomas Carlyle, as influential as Adam Smith. He was born in Ecclefechan, was a student in Edinburgh, was briefly a teacher in Smith’s birthplace Kirkcaldy (though miserably), was husband of the equally intellectual Jane Welsh from Haddington, and then, through his astonishingly voluminous writing from his and Jane’s eventual home in Chelsea, became the sage of every kind of political critique of the destructiveness of the unrestricted market, of the dehumanising effects of industrialism, of the deplorable fact, as he saw it, that ‘men have grown mechanical in heart as well as in mind’:
it is no longer the moral, religious, spiritual condition of the people that is our concern, but their physical, practical, economical condition as regulated by public laws. Thus is the Body-politic more than ever worshipped and tendered; but the Soul-politic less than ever. Love of country, in any high or generous sense, in any other than an almost animal sense, or mere habit, has little importance attached to it in such reforms, or in the opposition shown them. Men are to be guided only by their self-interests. Good government is a good balancing of these; and, except a keen eye and appetite for self-interest, requires no virtue in any quarter. … Its duties and its faults are not those of a father, but of an active parish-constable.
(Carlyle, 1858 [1829]: 106-7)
It was Carlyle who coined the term the ‘cash nexus’ to sum up what had poisoned human relations. It was Carlyle who most inspired every Victorian novelist of the mid-century, notably Dickens whose Hard Times is a literary translation of Carlyle’s ideas. And it was Carlyle who became one of the most widely read writers by the founders of the Labour party and by Labour MPs well into the twentieth century (Rose, 2001: 41-8).
The reason why he was so influential at that time was his closely argued belief that power ought to be used for human ends. Power for him, as one of his many socialist admirers in the twentieth century – Raymond Williams – says, was something ‘positive and ennobling’ (Williams, 1963: 90). Carlyle believed that the problem was individualism, and thus that even democracy could not work unless it was founded on a universal morality. Central to Carlyle’s response to the anomie of capitalism is compulsory, state-funded education. In his essay on Chartism in 1841 he argued that universal education would ‘impart the gift of thinking to those who cannot think, and yet who could in that case think’ (Carlyle, 1888 [1841]: 175). He asserted belonging and community against the competitive liberalism of his day. He was a Tory, and yet his communitarian thinking always provoked leftist thought: that was why he was common reading among the first generation of Labour leaders, and could be so influential on humane liberals such as Dickens, and even on Engels and Marx.
Carlyle then is the essence of the Scottish indictment of capitalism. The key points of that critique inspired generation after generation of radical liberals and of socialists to use the power of the state to humanise capitalism, not merely to facilitate markets, although most of these people continued to believe that markets were the best means of securing the wealth without which humane rule would become the equal sharing of poverty. From Carlyle’s critique comes the modern world just as surely as it comes from Smith.
That then brings us to the long-term eventual outcome of these Scottish ideas of universal rights and of a common humanity: the welfare state of the twentieth century. The Scottish philosopher Edward Caird noted that Carlyle revived for the twentieth century ‘the old Platonic idea that the State had a social and ethical work to perform’ (Caird, 1892: 266). Sydney Webb, as close as anyone to being the founder of Labour’s views about the state, wrote that Carlyle ‘[kept] alive the faith in nobler ends than making a fortune in this world and saving one’s soul in the next’ (Webb, 1889: 64). From Carlyle’s doubts about capitalism come, through the radical Liberal and Labour traditions which his writing inspired, the belief that the state ought to be used to secure the common well-being of everyone, that the state could rise above sectional interests and assert the universal rights of all. From Carlyle’s belief in the shaping power of morality comes that unity of radical religion and social democracy that led to the 1945 Labour government. Ultimately from Carlyle comes one of the great Scottish religious critiques of the near collapse of liberal democracy in the 1940s, the Commission set up by the Church of Scotland under John Baillie, which argued in 1942 that wealth, though necessary, must be pursued only under ‘conditions suitable to the development of healthy social relationships’: ‘economic power’, the Commission concluded, ‘must be made … responsible to the community as a whole’ (quoted by Storrar, 1994: 64). The Baillie Commission also believed – and we will come back to this point, relevant as it is to a debate about independence – that a necessary part of restraining the totalitarian abuse of power was constitutional restrictions on absolute sovereignty: 
no plan [for the long-term maintenance of justice and peace among nations] can be successful which does not involve a real sacrifice by all the participating nations of some part of their present unlimited sovereignty.
(quoted by Storrar, 1994: 67)
We might even go so far as to say that Scottish thought, such as in the Baillie Commission, reinvented – or contributed significantly to reinventing – the Union in the twentieth century, because most Scottish twentieth-century thinkers believed that a reformed Union would continue to be the best means by which the universal values at the heart of Scottish political culture could have the widest scope for influence. The Union was no more an alien imposition in 1945 than it was in 1845 or – for most Scots – in 1745. The majority of Scots – led by Labour’s instinct that centralisation was required to achieve an equitable distribution of resources – on the whole did not favour separate welfare systems (Levitt, 1998, 1999). 
The key point, again, is the boldness of the universalism. Carlyle and his heirs epitomised Scottish culture in its liberal critique of unrestrained capitalism, but he and they never argued from a peculiarly Scottish point of view. They cast their critique in universal terms. His was not a critique of the cash nexus in Scotland alone: it was a critique for all places at all times. The Scottish Liberal and Labour thinkers, though mostly deeply attached to Scotland, argued for what they saw as Scottish values to inform the development of a better world. The Baillie Commission, or others in the 1940s, argued, on the basis of Scottish traditions of thought, that peace and a fairer world ought to be constructed, not in Scotland alone, or Britain alone, but universally. Thus the key Scottish values are again, in the twentieth century, universal values. If Scottish political culture has some reason to claim to have shaped the modern world it is not because the world has been shaped in Scotland’s image, but rather because Scotland’s image has been shaped by its vision of how the world ought to be.
3. Alternative Discourse
So why do we not remember this now? Why, since the 1980s (or perhaps a bit earlier), have Scottish values come to be seen as requiring distinctively Scottish solutions applicable to Scotland alone? One answer is appealing but does not work as an explanation. It is sometimes claimed that Scotland reacted against Thatcherism by re-asserting the values of the British welfare state that she seemed to be destroying. That is partly true as an explanation of the recent assertion of Scottish political distinctiveness, but the reason it does not explain what happened to Scottish universalism is that, on the whole, this re-assertion did not take the grand, ambitious form of previous Scottish critiques of unbridled capitalism. The Scottish response to Thatcherism did not seek to lead a new, universal moral crusade in the manner of a Carlyle or a John Baillie. The response to Thatcherism – which we still largely have today – was to seek sufficient autonomy for Scotland itself to construct a response in Scotland alone. By and large, this view spreads right across the political spectrum, and the arguments leading to the referendum this year are about how much autonomy Scotland should have, not – as they were in the past – about whether Scotland should seek to lead Britain or the world into a new kind of social order. We might imagine, for example, that the Scotland of the past would have sought to lead Europe. The Scotland of 1945 or of Carlyle’s day or of Adam Smith’s would have responded to Thatcher’s policies by seeking to place itself at the moral leadership of a reformed European Union, and would have sought to use that Union as a modern way of harnessing the power of the market to humane ends. Yet the Scotland of the 1980s and after did none of this. Scotland in Europe became a slogan to reassure people that independence would not be parochial, or – on the other side – became a slogan to argue that a modern version of independence is not feasible at all. Scotland in Europe has never been a claim to lead Europe.
In this Scottish loss of faith in its inheritance of universalism we have the essence of the problem with the debate Scotland is now having about the country’s constitutional future: it is about mechanisms rather than about moral destiny. And if saying this seems rather quaintly old-fashioned – if even talking about moral purposes seems out of place in political discourse – that is a measure of how far we have moved away from the old Scottish cultural principle that we all have a universal duty to everyone else. Carlyle, criticising what he saw in his day as the superficial obsession with the outward machinery of government, had this to say, contrasting a line of philosophers and theologians who were concerned with moral well-being to those whom he regarded as treating society mechanically 
we might note the mighty interest taken in mere political arrangements, as itself the sign of a mechanical age. … The deep, strong cry of all civilised nations … is: Give us a reform of Government! A good structure of legislation, a proper check upon the executive, a wise arrangement of the judiciary, is all that is wanting for human happiness. The Philosopher of this age is not a Socrates, a Plato, a Hooker, or Taylor, who inculcates on men the necessity and infinite worth of moral goodness, the great truth that our happiness depends on the mind which is within us, and not on the circumstances which are without us; but a Smith, a De Lolme, a Bentham, who chiefly inculcates the reverse of this, — that our happiness depends entirely on external circumstance.
(Carlyle, 1858 [1829]: 106)
(Carlyle’s inclusion of Smith in the latter group is rather unfair, but that’s an argument for another occasion.)
The essence of the problem about asserting universal moral principles today is – hardly surprisingly – not to be found in Scotland alone, but in a much more general loss of faith by liberals in the face of the allure of relativism, a loss of faith particularly on the political left. The fear is now that there are no universal values or universal social truths. There is a reluctance to judge in the name of absolute standards or values or norms of social organisation. Values, it is widely believed, are relative to particular traditions or communities or cultures, and no culture ought to seek to assert any body of values as being superior to any other. As Barry (2001: 264) puts it, writing about the phenomenon in general, but relating it specifically to a certain kind of nationalist discourse:
according to the doctrine of romantic nationalism, each culture constitutes a self-contained moral universe. For each of us, the horizons of our thought are set by the boundaries of our culture. Typically, romantic nationalists draw from this the conclusion that cultures are incommensurable, because there is no transcultural standpoint from which they could be compared.
Nationalism of that kind is not a view that the Enlightenment Scots would have accepted.
Now, there are good, understandable reasons why this widespread scepticism about universal claims has come about. There were the excesses of imperialism – in which, indeed, Scottish universalism played a significant role. There was the hypocrisy of slavery, in which universalism was denied, although there was also the Scottish Enlightenment influence on the campaign against slavery (Whyte, 2006). There was a religious triumphalism, such as in Carlyle’s enormous, global claim for Scottish religious traditions:
Scottish Puritanism, well considered, seems to me distinctly the noblest and completest form that the grand Sixteenth Century Reformation anywhere assumed. We may say also that it has been by far the most widely fruitful form; for in the next century it had produced English Cromwellian Puritanism, with open Bible in one hand, drawn Sword in the other. ... So that now we look for the effects of it not in Scotland only, or in our small British Islands only, but over wide seas, huge American continents and growing British Nations in every zone of the earth.
(Carlyle, 1899 [1875]: 359)
That is Scotland’s contribution to the modern hubris of all religion – the assumption by one sect that it has more perfect access to the universal mind of God than any other, whether that was for a while Protestantism as against Catholicism in Carlyle’s Britain, Catholicism as against Islam in southern Europe, Islam as against Buddhism and Judaism in some parts of the Middle East, or Judaism – the universally oppressed – against everything else in Palestine.
From that same vast ambition – the same universalism expressed as imperialism – has come the marginalising of minority cultures by dominant cultures masquerading as universal, such as, in Scotland itself, the attitude taken to the Gaelic and Scots languages until very recently. Consider John Stuart Mill – great Victorian liberal, hero of the left ever since, admired everywhere still today for his pioneering concern with human rights, notably the rights of women, and Scottish insofar as he was educated by his father who was himself brought up in Scotland. John Stuart Mill expressed the claims of liberal modernity rather unashamedly, writing in 1861:
Experience proves that it is possible for one nationality to merge and be absorbed in another; and when it was originally an inferior and more backward portion of the human race, the absorption is greatly to its advantage. Nobody can suppose that it is not more beneficial to a Breton, or a Basque of French Navarre, to be brought into the current of the ideas and feelings of a highly civilized and cultivated people – to be a member of the French nationality, admitted on equal terms to all the privileges of French citizenship, sharing the advantages of French protection, and the dignity and prestige of French power – than to sulk on his own rocks, the half-savage relic of past times, revolving in his own little mental orbit, without participation or interest in the general movement of the world. The same remark applies to the Welshman or the Scottish Highlander as members of the British nation.
(Mill, 1861: ch. 16)
That is liberal universalism at its most supremely arrogant. Everywhere there is a sense now today that part of the problem of the world is claims to universality, and thus a feeling that the appropriately liberal response is to refuse to be so presumptuous as to assert any universal values at all.
That is a widely recognisable change. The effect on the present Scottish debate is that Scottish political culture is now asserted not on universal, rational grounds, but on grounds that are particularistic, one among many national identities in a particularistic world characterised not only by lots of national identities, but also by other cultural specialisms (religions, languages, traditions of all sorts), and by sectional collective rights demanding recognition on the simple ground that they are felt and asserted. In the face of this environment of the assertion of the rights of particular cultural groups, liberalism is now much more tentative than it has ever been. Liberals and socialists are especially prone to this loss of faith in universal claims, because they have at the heart of their programme a respect for individuals and their rights. Though it is a fallacy to equate individual rights with group rights – and though the rights of minority groups would never, to a liberal, take precedence over the rights of individuals – the belief that individuals acquire an important part of their identity from the cultural groups to which they belong seems to many people on the left to provide a justification for asserting the rights of cultural groups, such as, supposedly, Scotland. It seems now always to risk imperialist dogmatism to assert anything universal that might transcend minority cultures, and so liberal-minded people retreat into embarrassed silence.
This situation has created in the past three or four decades an unprecedented context for the debate about Scottish self-government. Because that debate has been cast as being just another instance of small-nation assertion of its cultural distinctiveness against an over-centralised power, or against globalisation, the old universalism of Scottish political culture has been forgotten. It would seem bizarre, and certainly anachronistic, for either side in the present debate to claim that the main reason to support their favoured constitutional option for Scotland’s future is that it would give Scotland the greatest opportunity for influence in the world. Both sides do seem to say this, it is true, but mutedly. The supporters of Union do argue that Scotland gains influence by being a partner with the rest of Britain, and the supporters of independence do argue that a Scottish state would have a distinct voice in world affairs. But both sides argue this, not from the point of view of what would be best for humanity, but rather as what would best serve Scotland’s interests. To argue a case based on Scotland’s service to humanity would be regarded as so odd now as almost to risk ridicule for its pretension. The paradox of Scottish political culture now, then, is that all sides try to forget the full, universal implications of the Enlightenment past. All sides – unionist almost as much as nationalist, socialist and liberal almost as much as conservative – try to evade the moral implications of the universalism that Scotland used to claim.
4. Conclusion
What is to be made, in conclusion, of this history and of the present state of affairs in Scottish political culture? I have avoided so far in this essay taking any position in the great constitutional question facing Scotland now. That is not academic neutrality or reluctance to be committed, but rather because there is not merely one political conclusion to be drawn from the argument. The essay has tried to define the dominant theme of ‘Scottish political culture’ – not its essence, since there is no such thing in any culture, but that set of ideas which, until quite recently, were most to the fore in how Scotland saw itself and presented itself to the world. The essay has argued that the dominant characteristic was a combination of two things. One was a belief in universal rationality as the means to finding truth – by which is meant a combination of evidence and reason applied to evidence. The other was a respect for the equal worth of all people everywhere at any time. Both of these are universal, not particular to Scotland. Scottish culture has not lain primarily in its distinctive languages or music or literature or even politics: Scottish culture has lain in its denial of itself politically, in its confident assertion that to be Scottish is to have a duty to lead the world, to subsume the nation’s distinctiveness into a common humanity. All small countries have this sort of aspiration somewhere – the belief that ideas can overcome the risk of isolation. But Scotland, where the Enlightenment is so central to the modern nation’s history, and where partnership in a global empire was so important to the nation’s modern development, has, perhaps more than any other small nation, the inclination to universalism inescapably at the heart of its political identity.
The reason there is no straightforward political conclusion is that I doubt if Nicola Sturgeon or Michael Russell would fundamentally disagree with that. Nor would Patrick Harvie of the Greens, since there could not be anything more universal (in the human sense that I am meaning it) than the very future of the planet. And we can more certainly say that the faith in the shared human concerns which I have attributed to the dominant Scottish tradition has undoubtedly been expressed by the leading thinkers in the liberal strand of Scottish nationalism, writers such as the late Stephen Maxwell and the late Neil  MacCormick. MacCormick, one the most distinguished legal scholars of our times, internationally – and with friends across the spectrum of Scottish politics – argued for liberal social democracy because it is universalistic, in the sense, he said, that social democracy ‘holds that whatever rights or duties attach to any particular human being in given circumstances must be considered as universalizable’ (MacCormick, 1999: 175). Political nationalist though he was, he readily pointed to the failure of ‘not a few nationalists’ to respect universalism, and he concluded, echoing the Baillie Commission of 1942 (though not explicitly):
the principle of national self-determination becomes morally and practically problematic because (or when) it is coupled to the concept or doctrine of the absolutely sovereign state. For in this form it stipulates that whoever constitute a nation have the right (unless they freely renounce it) to constitute themselves into a sovereign state.
But there are too many nations in the world for this to be practicable. Thus,
there can be no practical universalizability of the right to respect for national identity and the duty of mutual respect if one insists on strong self-determination coupled with the doctrines associated with state sovereignty.
(MacCormick, 1999: 187-90)
So we can finish with three propositions. The first is that the main Scottish tradition of thought has been to assert the common value of all human beings, and to assert that the same values, principles and rights apply to everyone, everywhere. The sheer tenacity of Scottish adherence to this has been the main distinctive feature of Scotland’s political culture in the past three or four centuries. The second conclusion is that this tradition lives on in much of Scottish political discourse insofar as nearly all of what we talk about is set within the framework of liberal social democracy. But that survival of belief in universalism is muted, because liberal social democracy throughout Europe has lost faith in its own universality. Left-wing thought seems unlikely to survive as a credible political ideology if it does not recover that, even at the price of seeming arrogance. If there is to be a future for liberalism or for social democracy, it will have to be in the form of asserting universal rights against all kinds of particularism, and that includes against any kind of Scottish particularism that argues for Scottish autonomy on the grounds of Scottish uniqueness. The only acceptably liberal grounds for Scottish autonomy of any kind, whether fully independent or not, are – as Neil MacCormick argued – those which assert it as part of universal claims to equal rights.
So the third conclusion finally does bring us to the question of the constitution, but leaves us with a final dilemma. The only way in which the constitutional arrangements Scotland chooses will be consistent with the older Scottish political traditions that have been outlined here would be if these political arrangements help to promote Scotland’s allegiance to universalism. Universalism would not be consistent with an independence that failed to be about Scotland’s contribution to the world, but neither would a Union that was merely about Britain and was not also about the inadequacy of all forms of sovereignty, Scottish, British or any other. 
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